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Performance Implications of Strategic Performance Measurement
in Financial Services Firms

Abstract
This study examines the relation between measurement system satisfaction,
economic performance, and two general approaches to strategic performance
measurement: greater measurement diversity and improved alignment with firm strategy
and value drivers. We find consistent evidence that firms making more extensive use of a
broad set offmancial and (particularly) non-financial measures than firms with similar
strategies or value drivers hav e higher measurement system satisfaction and stock market
returns. However, we find little support for the alignment hypothesis that more or less
extensiv e measurement than predicted by the firm's strategy or value drivers adversely
affect performance. Instead, our results indicate that greater measurement emphasis and
diversity than predicted by our benchmark model is associated with higher satisfaction
and stock market performance. Our results also suggest that greater measurement
diversity relative to firms with similar value drivers has a stronger relationship with stock
market performance than greater measurement on an absolute scale. Finally, the
balanced scorecard process, economic value measurement, and causal business modeling
are associated with higher measurement system satisfaction, but exhibit almost no
association with economic performance.

Performance Implications of Strategic Performance Measurement
in Financial Services Firms

1. Introduction

Managerial accounting is evolving to encompass a more strategic approach that
emphasizes the identification, measurement, and management of the key financial and
non-financial drivers of strategic success and shareholder value (International Federation
of Accountants, 1998; Institute of Management Accountants, 1999). In response, many
firms are adopting strategic performance measurement (SPM) systems that (1) provide
information that allows the firm to identify the strategies offering the highest potential for
achieving the firm's objectives, and (2) align management processes, such as target
setting, decision-making, and performance evaluation, with the achievement of the
chosen strategic objectives (e.g., Gates, 1999; Otley, 1999).
Proponents of strategic performance measurement advocate two general
approaches for developing SPM systems. The simplest approach calls for firms to
measure and use a diverse set of financial and non-financial measures. Advocates of this
"measurement diversity" approach argue that a broad set of measures keeps managers
from suboptimizing by ignoring relevant performance dimensions or improving one
measure at the expense of others. As a result, these advocates claim that firms achieve
higher performance when they place greater emphasis on a broad set of financial and
non-financial performance measures (e.g., Lingle and Schiemann, 1996). A second
approach is based on contingency theory, which argues that strategic performance
measures must be aligned with the firm's strategy and/or value drivers (Fisher, 1995b;
Langfield-Smith, 1997). Under this approach, performance theoretically is enhanced
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when "measurement gaps" between the firm 's strategic priorities and measurement
practices are minimized. Thus, performance is expected to be lower when the SPM
system places either less or more emphasis on a measurement practice than the level
required by the firm 's strategy and value drivers.
Closely related to the contingency perspective is the use of measurement techniques
such as the balanced scorecard process, causal business modeling, and economic v alue
measurement. Advocates argue that these techniques help companies improve the
alignment between their performance measurement systems more closely to their
organizational objectives (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1996, 2001; Gates, 1999; Stewart,
1991; Young and O' Byrne, 2001). Despite these arguments, the extent to which firms
claiming to use these techniques actually link their performance measures more closely to
strategic priorities is unknown.
Using data from 140 U.S. financial services firms, we extend prior research on the
performance implications of strategic performance measurement along several
dimensions. First, we examine a broader set of measurement system uses (goal setting,
capital investment decisions, identification of improvement opportunities and
development of action plans, performance evaluation, and external disclosure) and
measurement capabilities than prior studies that typically focus only on performance
evaluation and compensation. Second, we investigate the relation between SPM
practices and actual financial outcomes (accounting and stock returns) rather than relying
exclusively on self-reported measurement satisfaction or firm performance. Third, we
examine each of the SPM approaches and compare their relative ability to explain firm
performance. Fourth, we extend prior contingency research by looking at the alignment
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between specific value drivers and measurement, in addition to the traditional alignment
with firm or manufacturing strategy. Fifth, we prov ide ev idence on the use and
performance consequences of the three measurement alignment techniques (balanced
scorecard, economic value measurement, and business modeling), an area that has
received surprisingly little attention in the research literature. Finally, we examine
potential lags between the implementation of performance measurement systems and
economic results.
We find consistent ev idence that SPM practices are associated with one- and
three-year stock returns, but not with our two accounting m easures (return on assets and
sales growth). In particular, financial services firms that make more extensive use of a
broad set offmancial and (particularly) non-financial measures than those with similar
strategies or value drivers earn higher stock returns. These results are even stronger in
the subsample of firms with more mature performance measurement systems, suggesting
that these measurement practices yield economic results with some lag.
We find little support for the hypothesis that more or less extensiv e measurement
than predicted by the firm ' s strategy or value drivers adversely affect performance.
Instead, our results indicate that g reater measurement emphasis and diversity than
predicted by our benchmark model is associated with higher satisfaction and stock
market performance. These findings suggest that the average measurement practices of
firms pursuing similar strategies or value drivers currently are not optimal in this
industry.
We also find that greater measurement diversity compared to firms w ith similar
strategies or value drivers has a stronger relationship with stock market performance than
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greater overall measurement. This evidence suggests that the appropriate benchmark for
assessing measurement div ersity is greater measurement relative to competitors with
similar strategies or value drivers rather than greater measurement on an absolute scale.
On average, firms claiming to use a balanced scorecard exhibit few differences in
their emphasis on non-financial performance categories than non-users, and make little
use of the causal "business models" of leading and lagging indicators that balanced
scorecard advocates claim is a foundation of the scorecard process. In contrast, economic
value and business model users place significantly greater emphasis on non-financial
value drivers and measures than firms that do not use these practices. Although balanced
scorecard, economic value, and causal business model users all rate satisfaction with their
measurement systems higher than non-users, we find almost no evidence that these
techniques are associated with accounting or stock market performance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section
reviews related literature and develops our hypotheses . We then discuss our sample
selection and measurement methods. The next section reports our contemporaneous
performance results, followed by our analysis of lagged performance effects in the subset
of more mature systems. A summary of our results and limitations to our study conclude.

2. Literature Review and Hypotheses
A study by the Conference Board defines strategic performance measurement (SPM)
as a system that ''translates business strategies into deliverable results. SPM systems
combine fmancial, strategic, and operating business measures to gauge how well a
company meets its targets (Gates, 1999, p. 4). Case studies by Gates (1999) and Ruddle
and Feeny (2000) find that firms have adopted two general approaches to designing SPM
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sy stems. In the following sections, we rev iew each of these approaches and dev elop
hypotheses regarding their performance implications.

2.1 Greater "Measurement Diversity"
One approach to strategic performance measurement is supplementing traditional
fmancial measures with a diverse mix of non-financial measures that are expected to
capture key strategic performance dimensions that are not accurately reflected in shortterm accounting measures. Fisher (1995a) and Brancato (1995) indicate that many firms
believe that financial measures are too historical and "backward-looking," lack predictiv e
ability to explain future performance, reward short-term or incorrect behavior, provide
little information on root causes or solutions to problems, and give inadequate
consideration to difficult to quantify "intangible" assets such as intellectual capital. As a
result, many firms are supplementing financial metrics with a diverse set of non-financial
performance measures that are believed to provide better information on strategic
progress and success.1
Early writings on the balanced scorecard provided considerable impetus behind this
"measurement diversity " approach to SPM. Kaplan and Norton's (1992) original
balanced scorecard article argues that firms should supplement financial measures with
non-financial measures focused on three other perspectives: customers, internal business
processes, and learning and growth. Although the authors note that the specific measures
within these categories should be tailored to the firm 's strategy, they also claim that these
broad perspectives are common across (and should be used with) all strategic choices.

1

Consistent with these claims, a munber of accounting studies provide evidence that non-fmancial
measures can be leading indicators of financial performance (e.g., Ittner and Larcker, 1997; Behn and
Riley, 1999; Banker et al., 2000; Nagar and Raj an, 200 1; Ittner et al. , 2003). However, only Banker et al.
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Other writers have extended these categories by adding additional perspectives focused
on employees, partners and suppliers, and the environment (e.g., Edvinsson and Malone,
1997; Schiemann and Lingle, 1999). An assumption in these classification schemes is
that measurement across all these categories is necessary regardless of the firm ' s strategy .
Schiemann and Lingle ( 1999, p. 8), for example, write:
For us, measuring the "right things" entails measuring results in the six performance
areas that are key to strategic success. And when we use the term "strategic
measurement," we mean measurement focused on these six perspectives or areas of
performance.
Several empirical studies implicitly or explicitly draw on the measurement diversity
approach in their tests. A widely-cited practitioner-oriented study by Lingle and
Schiemann ( 1996) reports that "measurement-managed" firms (defined as those in which
management updates and reviews semiannual performance measures in three or more of
their six primary performance categories, and where senior management reports being in
agreement on measurable criteria for determining strategic success) achieve statistically
higher self-reported industry standing, financial performance relative to competitors, and
progress in managing change efforts than firms that are not "measurement-managed." 2
Scott and Tiessen 's ( 1999) academic study indicates that w ork teams having more
diverse performance measures (i.e., both financial and non-fmancial measures or more
categories of measures) achieve higher self-assessed performance (relative to
expectations). Hoque and James (2000) also find a significant positive relation between
perceived organizational performance and the use of a diverse set of performance

(2000) and Ittner et al. (2003) examine the use of these measures for performance ev aluation or decisionmaking purposes.
2
Although Lingle and Schiemann (1996) provide evidence on the extent of "measurement gaps" in their
sample, they do not use these gaps in their performance tests, instead relying on the level of measurement
in their performance categories.
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measures related to the four balanced scorecard categories. Howev er, all of these studies
place heavy reliance on perceptual results indicators and/or simple univariate tests,
making it difficult to place substantive interpretations on their results.
Theoretical research on the economic benefits from greater measurement diversity is
ambiguous. N early all of this work focuses on reward systems. Holmstrom ( 1979) and
Banker and Datar (1989) show that more (costless) measures are preferred to fewer if the
additional measures prov ide incremental information on dimensions of the agent's
actions that the principal wishes to motivate.

In addition, Feltham and X ie ( 1994),

Hauser et al. (1994), and Hemmer (1996) demonstrate how incentives based on nonfmancial measures can improve contracting by incorporating information on managerial
actions that is not fully captured in contemporaneous financial results. However, these
theories also imply that a performance category (e.g., the four balanced scorecard
perspectives) may not improve incentive contracting if it provides no incremental
information on the manager's action, imposes too much risk on the agent, or is too costly
to measure, indicating that the measurement diversity approach to SPM may have no
impact on economic performance.
The limited and mixed evidence on the performance implications of this SPM
approach leads us to examine our first hypothesis:
H1: Organizational performance is positively associated with the extent to which the
firm measures and uses information related to a diverse set offmancial and nonfinancial performance measures.
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2.2 Alignment with Strategy and Value Drivers
A second general approach emphasizes the implementation of performance
measurement systems that are more closely linked to the firm's specific strategy and
value drivers. Contingency theory has long held that control systems must be aligned
with organizational characteristics such as firm strategy (see Fisher, 1995b for a review).
Similarly, economic theories contend that the optimal design of a rrrm ' s information and
reward systems is a function of the firm's business strategy (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts,
1992; Brickley et al., 1997).
More recently, advocates of this SPM approach have extended these theories to argue
that a key element in managing the links between strategy and performance is identifying
and measuring the specific factors, or ''value drivers," that actually lead to strategic
success or firm value (Ittner and Larcker, 2001). By linking strategies to their underlying
value drivers, and tying information systems, goals and objectives, resource allocation,
and performance evaluation to these drivers, SPM systems are expected to improve
communication of the specific actions required to achieve the chosen strategy, motivate
performance against strategic value driver goals, and prov ide more rapid feedback on
whether the strategy is achieving its objectives. In addition, the SPM literature
increasingly argues that the value driver analysis should not only influence the design and
use of measurement systems, but should also affect external disclosure requirements
(e.g., Black et al., 1998; Gates, 1999; Eccles et al., 2001). This use of SPM systems is
consistent with calls in the financial accounting community for greater disclosure of
information on key value drivers (e.g., American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, 1994; Wallman, 1995, Financial Accounting Standards Board, 2001).
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Academic research on contingency approaches to strategic performance measurement
falls into three categories. Early studies focused on the influence of perceived
environmental uncertainty (PEU) on management accounting systems. According to this
literature, PEU relates to the extent to which the firm 's competitive environment is highly
dynamic and unpredictable, factors that are likely to be highly correlated with the extent
to which the firm 's strategy is focused on innovation and growth (Dent, 1990; LangfieldSmith, 1997). Larcker (1981) and Gordon and N arayanan (1984), for example, examine
the relation between PEU and three performance measurement system attributes: focus
(internal vs. external measures), quantification (financial vs. non-fmancial measures), and
time horizon (historical vs. future-oriented), with mixed results. Larcker 's ( 1981) study
of strategic capital budgeting decisions finds no association between environmental
characteristics and variations in the perceived importance of these measurement
attributes. In contrast, Gordon and Narayanan ( 1984) find a significant positive
association between PEU and the perceived importance of externally-oriented, nonfmancial, and ex ante information. Chenhall and Morris (1986) examine the association
between PEU and the perceived usefulness of four management accounting system
attributes: scope (i.e., the external, non-financial, and future-oriented attributes examined
in the two previous studies), timeliness, aggregation (i.e., the level of aggregation by time
period and functional area and the use of analytical or decision models), and integration
(i.e. , the setting of precise targets for activities and their interdependencies and the
reporting of intra-sub-unit-interactions). They find significant positive associations
between PEU and preferences for broader scope and more timely information, but no
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associations with aggregation and integration preferences. None of these studies
investigates performance consequences.
More recent studies directly examine the effects of organizational strategy on
performance measurement choices, and the relation between these choices and
organizational performance. These studies typically measure strategy as a continuum
between firms following a "defender," "harvest," or "cost leadership" strategy and firms
following a "prospector," "build," or "innovation" strategy. The majority of these studies
fmd significant relations between the organization's strategy and performance
measurement system, with a smaller set of studies also finding higher organizational
performance when measurement is more closely aligned with the chosen strategy.
Simons (1987) and Govindarajan (1988), for example, find higher performance in
organizations following defender or low cost strategies when bonuses are based on
budget targets. Govindarajan and Gupta (1985) also fmd that greater reliance on nonfmancial compensation criteria has a stronger positive impact in organizations following
a build strategy than in those following a harvest strategy. Studies by Abernethy and
Guthrie (1994), Chong and Chong (1997), and Bouwens and Abernethy (2000), among
others, generally support the hypothesis that broad scope performance measurement
systems are associated with higher (self-reported) performance in companies following
prospector or differentiation strategies.
A third set of studies provides evidence on the associations between specific
manufacturing strategies or value drivers (such as quality and flexibility), the choice of
performance measures, and manufacturing performance. This research finds systematic
links among these choices, with an organization's emphasis on inventory reduction or
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just-in-time production, quality, or manufacturing flexibility positively associated with
the provision of non-financial measures and goals and greater emphasis on non-financial
measures in reward systems. However, empirical support for the hypothesized
performance benefits from these measurement practices is mixed, with some studies
fmding positiv e performance effects when manufacturing strategies are aligned with
measurement systems (e.g., Abernethy and Lillis, 1995), others finding mixed results
depending upon the type of performance measurement attribute being examined or the
extent to which other manufacturing improvement practices are implemented (e.g., Sim
and Killough, 1998; Ittner and Larcker, 1997), and others finding no significant
associations (e.g., Young and Selto, 1991; Perera et al., 1997).
Although the contingency-based performance measurement literature is relatively
extensiv e, it generally looks at only one or a few strategies or value drivers at a time,
does not compare results across v arious SPM approaches (e.g., measurement diversity vs.
strategy alignment vs. v alue driver alignment), and relies quite heavily on respondents'
self-reported performance. As a result, we extend these studies by providing further
evidence on the following hypotheses:
H2: Organizational performance is positively associated with the extent to which
performance measurement practices are aligned with the firm's strategy.
H3: Organizational performance is positively associated with the extent to which the
performance measurement practices are aligned with the firm's value drivers.

2. 3Measurement Alignment Techniques
The performance measurement literature proposes several techniques that are claimed
to improve the alignment between performance measurement systems and the firm's
organizational objectives. These techniques include the balanced scorecard process,
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economic value measurement, and causal business models. Kaplan and Norton's (1996,
2001) recent writings on the balanced scorecard, for example, define this process as a
method for using financial and non-financial measures to communicate the multiple,

linked objectives that a firm must achieve to satisfy its mission and reach its long-term
strategic goals. According to these authors, balanced scorecard systems improve
performance by translating strategy into specific objectives and measures that are linked
in a causal chain of leading and lagging indicators covering the four scorecard
perspectives (financial, customer, internal business process, and learning and growth).
Economic value-based SPM systems focus on the creation of long-term shareholder
value through the use of residual income or cashflow-related measures. Advocates of
economic value techniques (often referred to as value-based management approaches)
argue that performance measurement systems should be aligned with the firm's ultimate
organizational objective: improved economic performance. Stem et al. (1995), for
example, maintain that effective performance measurement requires the firm to make
economic value measures the cornerstone of a total management system that focuses on
shareholder value enhancement for capital budgeting, goal setting, inv estor
communication, and compensation. The resulting performance measurement system is
expected to improve alignment between performance measures and strategic objectives
by requiring rrrms to choose internal objectives that lead to shareholder value
enhancement, select strategies to achieve these objectives, identify the value drivers that
actually create value for the firm, and select action plans, lower-level performance
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measures, and targets based on the priorities identified in the value driver analysis (Dixon
and Hedley, 1993; Stem et al., 1995; Copeland et al., 1996).4
A third alignment technique that is stressed in both the balanced scorecard and
economic value literatures is the formal development of causal "business models."
Eccles ( 1991), for example, argues that effective performance measurement system
design requires firms to first understand the causal model linking key success factors to
the ultimate objectives ofthe firm. Kaplan and Norton (1996, 2001) now state that a
critical element of the balanced scorecard process is the development of "strategic maps"
that embed strategy in a system of cause-and-effect relations that connects desired
strategic outcomes with the drivers expected to lead to these outcomes. Similarly, Dixon
and Hedley (1993), Copeland et al. (1996), and Young and O'Byme (2001) stress the
importance of linking financial performance measures and their non-financial value
drivers to achieve the benefits from economic value measurement programs and promote
value-creating behavior in the firm. 5 Despite this emphasis on causal business models,
Gates' ( 1999) study indicates that most firms adopt SPM systems without articulating
these causal models or maps.
Surprisingly little research has been conducted on the performance implications ofthe
proposed measurement alignment techniques. Surveys on the use of balanced scorecards
(Towers Perrin, 1996; Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 1998; Banker et al., 2001a, Rigby,

4

Forty-one percent of the firms in Gates' ( 1999) study describe their SPM systems as value-based, while
40 percent describe their systems as following a balanced scorecard approach. Although many firms view
their economic value measurement systems as strategic, others argue that these systems do not actually
represent SPM systems because they focus on a single outcome (shareholder value) rather than on the
strategies used to achieve this outcome. In addition, some critics of economic value measures charge that
these metrics drive managers to focus on short-term operational and financial performance, to the detriment
oflonger-term investments in customers, innovation, and employee capabilities (e.g., Kaplan and Norton,
2001, pp. 378-379). We examine these assertions later in the paper.
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2001; Sandt et al., 2001; Kaplan and Norton, 2001, p. 357) and economic value measures
(Ittner and Larcker, 1998) typically find moderately greater satisfaction with or perceived
performance from these techniques than from other performance measurement practices.
In contrast, Ittner et al. 's (2003) examination of a balanced scorecard bonus plan in a
large bank indicates that the scorecard plan was deemed unsuccessful, leading it to be
abandoned in fav or of a revenue-based incentive plan. Sandt et al. (200 1) and Banker et
al. (200 1b) also find greater satisfaction with performance measurement systems when
systematic linkages among performance measures are understood and articulated.
However, none of these studies directly examines the association between these
techniques and actual firm performance.
Wallace (1997) and Hogan and Lewis (1999) reach conflicting conclusions regarding
the performance of firms adopting compensation plans based on economic value
measures. Wallace (1997) finds economic value adopters, relative to a control sample of
non-adopters, decrease new investments, increase payouts to shareholders through share
repurchases, and utilize assets more intensively, leading to significantly greater change in
residual income. In contrast, Hogan and Lewis ( 1999) fmd no significant difference in
economic v alue users and non-users after matching control fmns on past performance to
control for mean reversion in performance levels.
The claimed benefits from the measurement alignment techniques, together with the
limited evidence to support these claims, lead to our fmal hypothesis:
H4: Organizational performance is positively associated with the use of balanced
scorecards, economic value measures, and causal business models.

5

See Heskett (1 994) for examples of causal business models linking employye measures, customer
measures, and financial performance.
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3. Data and Variables

3.1 Sample
We test these hypotheses using a sample ofU.S. financial services firms that
responded to a survey conducted by the authors in conjunction with the Cap Gemini Ernst
& Young Center for Business Innovation. In contrast to most prior research, we restrict

our sample to a single industry. An important advantage of this choice is that we can
implicitly control for the myriad of confounding variables that can substantively impact
any results from a multi-industry, cross-sectional study. The financial services industry
was selected because our field research on performance measurement innovations
indicates that financial service firms are actively debating their choice of value drivers
and performance measures. Although restricting the sample to a single industry limits
our ability to generalize the results, we believe that a single industry analysis has
substantially higher internal v alidity than a multi-industry analysis.
A random sample of 600 firms was solicited to participate in the survey. A
marketing research firm telephoned senior executives from each of these firms to request
participation. Those agreeing to participate were sent a survey or guided to a web site
containing the questionnaire. Executives from 140 firms (23.3%) completed usable
surveys during November of 1999. The respondents represent a variety ofrmancial
service sectors, including regional banks (33.3% of the sample), insurance companies
(21.4%), diversified financial firms (17.1%), savings and loans (14.3%), money center
banks (5.7%), and others (e.g., consumer finance, investment banking, etc.) (7.1 %).
Relative to the population of financial services firms on Compustat, the resulting sample
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contains a larger percentage of diversified financial firms , life insurance companies, and
banks, and a smaller percentage of investment banks and savings and loans.

3.2 Strategy
We asked respondents to evaluate 12 aspects ofthe company's organizational
strategy and corporate environment that are commonly used to measure strategy and
perceived environmental uncertainty. Principal components analysis ofthese questions
(with oblique rotation) rev eals three factors with eigenvalues greater than one. The
factors capture the extent to which the firm's strategy focuses on (1) innovation, (2)

flexibility in changing its product and service offerings and responding to market
demands, and (3) m aintaining current relationships and product offerings by pursuing
existing customers and markets in stable environments.
The three strategy constructs represent the average standardized response to each
6

question loading greater than 0.40 on these factors. Flexible equals the average answer to
four questions asking the respondent' s agreement with the statements, "We respond rapidly
to early signals of opportunity in our market," "We hav e greater flexibility to respond to
changes in our environment than our competitors," "We have the ability to adjust capacity
within a short period oftime," and " We have the ability to change product or service
offerings rapidly" (scales ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree).

Innovate equals the average standardized response to four questions asking the
respondent's agreement with the statements, " We offer a more expanded range of products
and services than our competitors," " We are first to market with new products or services,"
" We respond rapidly to early signals of opportunity in our market," and "We expect most

6

One question asking whether the firm is more cost efficient than its competitors did not load greater than
0.40 on any of the factors. This question is dropped from the analysis.

17
of our future growth in profits to come from our new product and service offerings."

Maintain equals the average standardized response to three questions asking the
respondent's agreement with the statements, " We are most active in developing the markets
we currently serve, rather than entering new markets with our products or services," "We
operate in markets for our products or services that are highly predictable," and ''It is easy
to forecast how actions of competitors will affect the performance of our organization."
Coefficient alphas are 0.66 for Innovate, 0.75 for Flexible, and 0.46 for Maintain. The
Pearson (Spearman) correlation between Innovate and Flexible is 0.49 (0.50), between

Innovate and Maintain is 0.18 (0.15), and between Flexible and Maintain is 0.17 (0.15). 7
3.3 Value Drivers
Respondents were also asked the extent to which various performance categories are
important drivers of their firms' long-term organizational success, on a scale ranging
from 1 (not at all important or not applicable to their organization) to 6 (extremely
important). The ten value driver categories include short-term financial performance
(e.g., annual earnings, return on assets, cost reduction), customer relations (e.g., market
share, customer satisfaction, customer retention), employee relations (e.g., employee
satisfaction, turnover, workforce capabilities), supplier relations (e.g., on-time delivery,
input into product/service design), operational performance (e.g., productivity, safety,
cycle time), product and service quality (e.g., defect rates, quality awards), alliances with
other organizations (e.g., joint marketing or product design, joint ventures),
environmental performance (e.g., government citations, environmental compliance or

7

Despite the significant correlations, in no case does the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) exceed 2.5 in any
of our regression models, suggesting no serious problems with multicollinearity in our tests. Since one
question cross-loaded on the Innovate and Flexible factors, we repeated our analyses after dropping this
question from the strategy constructs. This change had no substantive impact on our results.
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certification), product and setvice innovation (e.g., new product or setvice development
success, development cycle time), and community (e.g., public image, community
involvement). These ten categories are drawn from value driver discussions in the
balanced scorecard, intangible asset, intellectual capital, and value-based management
literatures (e.g., Kaplan and N orton, 1996, 2001 ; Edvinsson and Malone, 1997;
Schiemann and Lingle, 1999).
Table 1 provides the mean importance score given to each of the v alue driver
categories. Short-term financial performance ranks only fourth most important, behind
customer relations, product and setvice quality, and operational performance.
Innovation, community relations, and employee relations also receive relativ ely high
importance scores, w ith environmental performance and supplier relations believed to be
relatively unimportant in this industry.
Spearman correlations among the strategy and v alue driv er measures are shown in
Table 2. Correlations between the strategy constructs and indiv idual value driv ers are
generally small (mean

=

0.132, median = 0.125). Two value driver categories do not

vary significantly with any ofthe strategies: short-term fmancial performance and
operational results. Innovate is positiv ely correlated (p < 0.10, two-tailed) w ith all of the
rem aining value drivers except community, with a mean (median) correlation of 0.188
(0.145). Flexible is positiv ely correlated with the importance placed on quality, alliances,
suppliers, and innov ation, but not w ith the other performance categories. Firms
following a M aintain strategy place greater emphasis on community and the
environment, but this strategy is not significantly associated with the other value drivers
categories. Overall, the relatively small correlations in Table 2 suggest that the firm 's
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chosen strategies are not synonymous with the v alue drivers used to achieve these
strategies. For example, the evidence suggests that some firms attempt to implement an

Innovate strategy by placing greater reliance on supplier expertise, while others focus on
improving innovation by developing their own, internal employee capabilities. These
results suggest that measuring a firm's overall strategy without considering its chosen
value drivers provides an incomplete representation of strategic attributes.

3.4 Peiformance Measurement Practices
We asked respondents the extent to which their firms use each ofthe ten value driver
categories for: (1) identifying problems and improvement opportunities and developing
action plans, (2) evaluating major capital investments, (3) evaluating managerial
performance, and ( 4) disclosing information to external parties (e.g., via fact books,
analyst meetings, conference calls, press releases, company internet websites, and oneon-one meetings). Scales for these questions range from 1 (not at all important or not
used at all) to 6 (used extensively or complete external disclosure). We also asked
respondents to rate how well their organizations measure information in these categories
(1 =extremely poor quality of measurement to 6 =high quality of measurement) and the
extent to which goals are set ( 1 = not applicable or no goals set to 6 = explicit goals set). 8
Table 1 provides information on the consistency between the perceived importance
of the individual value driver categories and the corresponding use and quality of

8

Although the sUIVey did not ask respondents the factors they considered when assessing measurement
quality, Cavalluzzo and Ittner (2003 ) find that managers' perceptions of measurement system quality are a
function of data limitations (i.e., the ability of existing information systems to provide valid, reliable, and
timely data in a cost effective manner) and difficulties selecting and interpreting appropriate performance
measures. Thus, responses to this question are likely to reflect performance measurement attributes other
than scope, such as timeliness and information system effectiveness, that have been identified in prior
studies (e.g., Chenhall and Morrris, 1986; Gates, 1999). The goal setting question, in tum, is consistent
with the target setting component ofChenhall and Morris' (1986) system integration construct, as w ell as
Simons' (1987) examination of the emphasis on budgetary and output goals in different strategic contexts.
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petformance measures related to these categories. With the exception of short-term
fmancial performance, the importance scores for each performance category are lower
than the scores provided for the use and quality of related performance measures. These
differences are consistent with the "measurement gaps" identified in other studies (e.g.,
Dixon et al., 1990; Lingle and Schiemann, 1996; Stivers et al., 1998). The differences
vary across uses, indicating that extensive use of performance measures for one purpose
does not necessarily imply that the measures are used for other purposes. The largest
differences relate to the external disclosure of customer and quality information, the use
of employee information for evaluating capital investments, and the quality of customerrelated measures. Differences related to identifying problems and developing action
plans generally are smaller than those associated with other uses.

3. 5 Use ofMeasurement Alignment Tecltniques
The use of performance measurement alignment techniques is assessed using three
questions on the implementation of balanced scorecards and economic value measures
(e.g., economic v alued added or cash flow return on investment) and the extent offormal
reliance on a "business model" or ''theory of business" that causally links petformance
drivers to performance outcomes. Following Krumwiede (1998), a six point scale is used
to measure the implementation of balanced scorecards or economic value measures,
where 1 = not considered, 2

=

implemented and abandoned, 3

implementing now, 5 = used, and 6

=

=

considering, 4 =

used extensiv ely. For our analyses, we code

scorecard or economic value measure use one if the respondent stated that the firm uses
or extensively uses that method, and zero otherwise. 9

9

We do not distinguish between firms that have not considered, are considering, or are implementing these
techniques because none of these firms actually used these techniques at the time of the survey, making it
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As shown in Panel A of Table 3, implementation of economic value measures is
more frequent than balanced scorecard implementation. More than one-third ofthe firms
(36.7%) use economic value measures to some extent and another 7.9% are implementing
them now. In contrast, only 20% use balanced scorecards, with an additional10.7% of
scorecard systems undergoing implementation. Roughly 50% of the firms have not
considered implementing a balanced scorecard, versus 31.4% for economic value
measures.
Business model reliance ranges from 1 =not at all to 6 =completely. N early thirty
percent of the firms place no reliance on a formal, causal business model or theory of the
business (Table 3, Panel B), and only 34.7% make substantial to complete use of business
models (four or greater on the six point scale). Extensive reliance on business models is
coded one for responses of four or greater to this question, and zero otherwise.
Although Kaplan and Norton (1996, 200 1) now argue that causal business models
are an integral component of the balanced scorecard concept, 76.9% of the firms claiming
to use a balanced scorecard place little or no reliance on business models (not reported in
the table). Similarly, 79.2% of economic value users make little or no use of business
models, despite claims that greater understanding of the causal model linking fmancial
and non-fmancial measures to economic results can enhance the benefits from the
adoption of economic v alue measures.

3. 6 Performance Variables

impossible to detect any performance differences due to these different responses. Very few firms have
implemented and abandoned these practices, preventing us from examining the performance consequences
ofthis decision. We also repeated the analyses using separate dichotomous variables for firms making
"extensive" use of these practices and firms making "very extensive" use. These results are reported later
in the paper.

22
We assess the performance implications of strategic performance measurement
using two sets of variables: (1) managers ' responses regarding their satisfaction with the
performance measurement system, and (2) publicly-av ailable information on the firm's
accounting and stock market performance. We include the satisfaction measure to allow
comparisons of our results to other performance measurement studies using satisfaction
as their dependent variable (e.g., Banker et al., 2001a, b; Rigby, 2001 ; Sandt et al., 2001).
The accounting and market measures provide more direct tests of the influence of
measurement practices on economic performance, which most SPM advocates argue is
the ultimate objective of these systems.
Three questions are used to measure a firm ' s satisfaction with its measurement
system: (1) how well the system meets expectations (1 =has not met expectations to 6 =
exceeded expectations); (2) how well the system compares to the respondent's concept of
an "ideal" system (1 =not at all ideal to 6 =very close to ideal); and (3) overall
satisfaction with the system ( 1 = not at all satisfied to 6 = completely satisfied). Actual
responses to all three questions range from 1 to 6, and indicate that these financial
services firms, on av erage, are moderately satisfied with their measurement systems.
Mean (median) scores are 3.54 (4.00) relative to expectations and 3.13 (3.00) relative to
ideal. Mean (median) overall satisfaction is 3.42 ( 4.00), with 20.0% of the respondents
rating their satisfaction 5 or 6 and 37.2% rating it 1 or 2. The three satisfaction questions
load on a single factor with a coefficient alpha of0.91. Our satisfaction construct
represents the average standardized response to these three questions.
We evaluate economic performance using several measures that are commonly
employed to assess financial results. These include two publicly-available accounting
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measures (return on assets and three-year sales growth) and two stock return measures
(one-year and three-year returns). The accounting and stock return performance
measures, obtained from Compustat and CRSP, are measured contemporaneously with
the date of the survey. The one-year measures are for fiscal1999 and the three-year
measures are for the time period covering fiscal 1997 to fiscal1999. For firms in our
sample, mean (median) sales growth is 22.5% (16.3%), and return on assets (ROA) is
1.8% (1.2%). Mean (median) one-year stock returns are -12.9% (-13.5%), while threeyear stock returns are 1.6% ( 1.9%).

10

We include several additional variables in the economic performance tests to
control for other potential determinants of accounting and stock price performance. To
account for the well-known effects of organizational size and growth opportunities on
firm performance, we include the log of assets (denoted Size) and the ratio of the book
value of assets to the market value of equity (denoted BTOM, an inverse measure of
growth opportunities) in the models. We also include the median performance of other
firms in the same four-digit SIC code to control for the effects of industry sector on
fmancial performance. 11

4. Performance Tests
We test our hypotheses by examining the relations between our firm performance
variables and four different measurement system characteristics: (1) overall

10

Compared to all financial senrices firms on Compustat, the mean finn in our sample has significantly
lower sales growth and stock returns. Return on assets is not statistically different.
11
Since finn strategy can also affect economic performance, w e repeated our performance tests using the
three strategy constructs as additional control variables. This addition had virtually no impact on our other
results.
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measurement diversity, (2) alignment with firm strategy, (3) alignment with firm value
drivers, and ( 4) use of measurement alignment techniques.

4.1 OverallMeasurementDiversity
Our first set of tests investigates whether greater "measurement diversity" is
associated with superior performance (Hypothesis 1). Consistent with claims in the
performance measurement literature, we assume that greater measurement diversity is
characterized by more extensive use of a broad set of financial and non-financial
measures for performance evaluation and decision-making purposes, independent of the
firm 's strategy and value drivers. Overall Measurement Diversity equals the av erage
standardized rating for each of the ten value driv er categories across all uses (problem
identification, capital investments, performance evaluation, and external disclosure), goal
setting, and measurement quality.

12

A higher value for this variable means that the firm

uses all of the measures to a greater extent, sets more extensive goals, and has greater
measurement quality for these categories.
Given the recent emphasis on the use of non-financial measures, we also examine the
relative importance of financial vs. non-fmancial measurement (denoted Financial

Measurement Focus and N on-Financial Measurement Focus, respectively). 13 If greater
non-financial measurement is more beneficial than greater fmancial measurement, the
association between performance and the use of non-financial measures will be stronger
than that with financial measures.

12

We use a single measurement focus construct rather than separate constructs for usage, goal setting, and
measurement quality because of high correlations among these practices, which creates problems with
multicollinearity. When separate constructs are computed for each of these three measurement
characteristics, the correlation between usage and goal setting is 0.79, between usage and measurement
~uality is 0.83, and between goal setting and measurement quality is 0.74.
1
Financial focus is measured by the values assigned to short-term financial results and non-financial focus
is measured by the average values assigned to the remaining nine performance categories.
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Evidence on the influence of Overall Measurement Diversity on performance is
presented in Panel A of Table 4. 14 When satisfaction with the measurement system is the
dependent variable, the coefficient on Overall M easurement D iversity is positiv e and
highly significant (p < 0.01, two-tailed), w ith an adjusted R 2 of0.215. As seen in Panel
B , this result is driven by greater use and improv ed measurement of non-financial
performance measures, which is significantly positive when overall measurement
diversity is decomposed into financial and non-financial components. In contrast, greater
emphasis on financial measures is not significantly associated with measurement
satisfaction. This evidence is consistent w ith prior studies that find greater measurement
satisfaction when more emphasis is placed on non-financial measures (e.g., Sandt et al.,
2001), but does not support claims that greater emphasis on traditional budgetary or
fmancial control uses of performance measures leads to lower satisfaction (Banker et al.,
2001b).
Although ov erall and non-fmancial measurement focus are positiv ely associated with
satisfaction, their relation with economic performance is mixed. Neither variable is
significantly associated with ROA, sales growth, or three-year stock returns. However,
both variables are positively related to one-year stock returns (p < 0.05, two-tailed).
These findings lend weak support to the hypothesis that greater measurement diversity is
associated with higher performance.
With respect to the control v ariables, firm performance is strongly related to sector
performance, while ROA is positively related to the firm 's growth opportunities (i.e.,

14

We delete observations from our performance tests when studentized residuals are greater than four
standard deviations from the mean in order to mitigate the impact of outliers on our results. For each
regression, fewer than three observations were removed.
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negatively related to its book-to-market ratio). Organizational size is not significant in
any ofthe models.

4.2 Alignment Between Strategy and Measurement Practices
The preceding tests assume that greater measurement diversity affects performance,
independent of the f"rrm's strategies. Contingency and economic theories, on the other
hand, contend that measurement practices must be aligned with the firm 's strategy. We
investigate these theories by examining whether performance is enhanced when strategy
and measurement are more closely aligned (Hypothesis 2). We first develop benchmark
models for assessing the extent of alignment by regressing each combination of
measurement characteristics (use, measurement quality, and goals) and type of measure
(e.g., short-term financial, customer, employee, etc.) on the three strategy constructs

(Flexible,Innovate, and Maintain). This yields 60 individual benchmark regressions
(i.e. , ten types of measures multiplied by six measurement characteristics).
Our proxies for measurement system alignment are then computed by averaging the
standardized residuals from these models . This approach assumes that firms, on average,
have correctly chosen their performance measurement systems, and that the estimated
models capture the appropriate benchmark for system characteristics given the firm's
strategy (Van de Vin and Drazin, 1985). If the benchmark models represent optimal
measurement practices, then any deviations from the estimated models (i.e., either too
little or too much measurement emphasis) should be negatively associated w ith
satisfaction or performance. These dev iations are analogous to the "measurement gaps"
discussed in the performance measurement literature in that gaps (or dev iations) between
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the perceived importance of a performance criteria and the criteria's use in the
performance measurement system are assumed to be detrimental.
To allow for potential differences between measurement practices that are less or
more extensive than predicted, we compute separate variables for negative and positive
residuals and then take their absolute values (denoted Negative Overall M easurement

Residual and Positive Overall Measurement Residual, respectively).15 We also subdivide
each of these variables into financial and non-financial components to investigate
whether this measurement distinction influences performance.
The resulting performance tests are presented in Table 5. The adjusted R 2s for the
satisfaction models (0.117 and 0.124) are smaller than those using the measurement
diversity scores in Table 4 (0.215 and 0.210). The differences in explanatory power
imply that respondents are more likely to rate measurement satisfaction in terms of the

overall diversity and extent of measurement rather than relative to the requirements of
their chosen strategies. Positive dev iations from the benchmark model have a significant

positive association with measurement satisfaction, indicating that firms with more
extensiv e measurement than competitors following similar strategies rate their systems
more highly. Howev er, negative deviations from the benchmark models show no
differences in satisfaction.
When the overall residuals are subdiv ided into financial and non-financial
components, Positive N on-Financial Measurement Residual has a highly significant

15

For example, assume that three firms have average residuals ofO, 3, and - 3 after averaging the residuals
across all 60 benchmark models . Negative Overall Measurement R esidual and Positive Overall
Measurement Residual equal (0, 0) for the first firm, (0, 3) for the second firm, and (3, 0) for the third
firm). Larger values (i.e., larger deviations in absolute value from the benchmark models) are hypothesized
to be negatively associated with performance in these tests. If positive and negative deviations from the
benchmark models have equal effects on performance, the coefficients on Negative Overall Measurement
Residual and Positive Overall M easurement Residual should be equal.
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positive association with satisfaction (p < 0.0 1, two-tailed), again suggesting that
satisfaction is related to greater use of non-fmancial measures than firms with similar
strategies. Negative Non-Financial Measurement Residual, in contrast, is not significant
in the satisfaction model.
Turning to the economic performance tests, we continue to find no evidence that
measurement characteristics are associated with accounting performance. We also find
no evidence that lower than predicted measurement influences performance. Greater than
predicted measurement (Positive Overall Measurement R esidual), on the other hand, has
positive and significant associations with both one-year stock returns (p < 0.05, twotailed) and three-year stock returns (p < 0. 10, two-tailed). When we subdivide the overall
residuals into financial and non-financial components, the individual financial and nonfmancial residual measures are not significantly associated with stock market
performance at the 10 percent level. This is somewhat surprising given the earlier
significant association between Positive Overall Measurement Residual and the two stock
return measures. Further analysis indicates that the differing results are due to positive
non-financial residuals being marginally insignificant (p < 0.12, two-tailed) in both stock
return models, and positive financial residuals being marginally insignificant in the threeyear stock return model (p < 0.14, two-tailed). Although these variables are individually
insignificant at conventional statistical levels, the two variables hav e a significant

combined effect on stock market performance. These results suggest that financial and
non-financial measurement deviations have a stronger j oint effect on performance than
either category individually.
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In sum, the evidence in Table 5 provides little support for the hypothesis that
deviations from our strategy alignment benchmark model (or "measurement gaps'') are
detrimental to performance. Instead, greater than predicted combined measurement of
fmancial and non-financial measures is associated with higher stock returns, while lower
than predicted measurement appears to have little influence on performance. These
results support Hypothesis 1 that greater measurement div ersity improves performance.
However, the significant associations between three-year stock returns and positive
measurement residuals in Table 5, together with the insignificant three-year stock market
results in Table 4, indicate that the appropriate benchmark may be greater measurement
relative to competitors following similar strategies rather than greater measurement on an
absolute scale.

4.3 Alignment Between Value Drivers and Measurement Practices
We next examine the association between firm performance and the alignment
between perceived v alue drivers and measurement practices (Hypothesis 3). We measure
value driver alignment using a method analogous to that used to compute the alignment
between strategy and measurement practices. Each measurement practice using a
particular type of measure is regressed on the score given to the corresponding value
driver (e.g., use, measurement quality, and goal setting for customer measures are each
regressed on the customer value driver score). Our alignment measures are based on the
average standardized residuals from these models. We again allow for differences in
lower and greater than predicted measurement by computing separate variables for
negative and positiv e residuals and then taking their respective absolute v alues. We also
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subdivide each of these variables into financial and non-rmancial components to examine
their respectiv e performance implications .
The results are presented in Table 6. As before, measurement system satisfaction
is positively associated with greater than predicted overall measurement (p < 0.01, twotailed). This is primarily due to the positive association with Positive Non-F inancial

Measurement Residual. In addition, lower than predicted overall and financial
measurement now have significant negativ e associations with satisfaction. The Neg ative

Overall Measurement Residual result differs from those in the earlier satisfaction tests
and, together with the N egative F inancial Measurement Residual result, implies that
satisfaction is lower when financial measurement practices are less extensive than that
required by the firm 's perceiv ed value drivers. Relative to satisfaction models using the
2

strategy alignment v ariables (Table 5), the adjusted R s in the Table 6 satisfaction models
are larger (0.117 and 0.124 vs. 0.199 and 0.195), suggesting that managers ' satisfaction
with the measurement system is more closely related to the alignment with value drivers
than to the alignment with strategy. However, the explanatory power using either set of
alignment variables is still somewhat lower than that using the overall measurement
diversity variables in Table 4 (0.215 and 0.210).
Similar to the earlier results, the value driver alignment variables are insignificant
in the ROA models. However, greater than predicted overall and non-financial
measurement now exhibit significant negative relations with sales growth, indicating that
more extensiv e measurement and use of non-financial measures than firms with similar
perceived value drivers is associated with lower sales growth. The stock return results
are similar to those using the strategy alignment variables, but the models ' explanatory
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power and the significance levels of the coefficients are generally higher using the
alignment with value drivers. Greater than predicted overall measurement is positively
associated with one- and three-year stock returns (p < 0.05, two-tailed), while lower than
predicted overall measurement remains insignificant. More importantly, the adjusted
R 2s in the overall measurement models increase from 0.091 (one-year return) and 0.126
(three-year return) using the strategy alignment variables to 0.110 and 0.146 using value
driver alignment.
When the ov erall measurement residual is broken into financial and non-financial
components, Positive N on-Financial Measurement Residual is again positiv e in both
stock return models (though marginally insignificant in the three-year return model), with
the coefficient's two-tailed confidence lev el in the one-year return model increasing from
0.88 using the strategy alignment measures to 0.95 using the value driver alignment
measures. Similarly, the two-tailed confidence level for the positive coefficient on

Positive Financial Measurement Residual in the three-year return model increases from
0.86 to 0.97. The models' explanatory power also improves, with the adjusted R 2 in the
one-year (three-year) stock return model increasing from 0.082 (0.127) in Table 5 to
0.099 (0.163) in Table 6.
Overall, the analyses in Table 6 provide only limited support for the hypothesis
that performance is enhanced when deviations or "measurement gaps" between a firm 's
performance measurement system and its value drivers are minimized. Rather,
performance is more strongly associated with measurement systems that are more
extensive and diverse than those of competitors with similar value drivers. Measurement
system satisfaction is enhanced when measurement is more extensive than predicted and
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reduced when measurement is less extensive than predicted. Consistent with the earlier
results, we again find that stock returns are higher when fmancial and non-fmancial
measurement are more extensive than predicted by the value driver benchmark model. In
addition, the greater statistical significance and explanatory power in these stock return
models, relative to those in earlier tests, suggest that assessing measurement practices
relative to the firm's value drivers is an important input into the choice of performance
measures.

4.4 Alignment Techniques, Value Drivers, and Measurement System Characteristics
We next examine the measurement alignment techniques discussed in the strategic
performance measurement literature. We first consider whether the perceived value
drivers and types of information used for different purposes are related to the adoption of
the balanced scorecard, economic value measures, and causal business modeling.

16

We

conduct these analyses to validate responses to these questions and to verify or refute
claims about the performance measurement emphases of firms adopting these practices.
Table 7 summarizes the results. The table lists the statistically significant mean
differences (p < 0.10, two-tailed) between users and non-users of these three techniques
(each coded 1 if that technique is used extensively, and 0 otherwise). The fewest
differences relate to the use or non-use of balanced scorecards. Despite the emphasis on
non-financial customer, innovation, and internal business process measures in the
balanced scorecard literature, we find little evidence that firms claiming to use scorecards
place greater emphasis on these performance categories than non-users. Mean responses
16

We also examined mean differences in stmtegies between users and non-users of these measurement
practices. Stmtegy is not significantly different between balanced scorecard users and non-users.
Extensive users of economic value measures and causal business models, on the other hand, tend to
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regarding the firm's value drivers and the measures used in problem identification are not
significantly different in the two groups. Two categories that do show significant
differences are supplier and employee measures, even though these categories are not
explicitly included in Kaplan and Norton' s (1996) four balanced scorecard perspectives.
Scorecard users set supplier goals more extensively and disclose more information on
supplier performance (along with community and alliance performance) to external
parties than non-users. Employee measures are also used more extensively for evaluating
capital investments and managerial performance and have higher measurement quality in
scorecard adopters. However, the many insignificant differences in the two groups bring
into question whether firms claiming to have balanced scorecards are actually using the
information, or have merely implemented measurement systems that capture information
corresponding to the scorecard categories without making changes in the information
used for decision-making and performance evaluation.
Economic value users rate operating performance a more important value driver
than non-users, consistent with claims that these measures promote an operational focus
(Kaplan and N orton, 2001, pp. 378-379). This focus is also evident in users' greater
emphasis on operating performance information for each measurement characteristic.
Environmental performance is considered a more important value driver in economic
value users, but short-term financial performance is not. However, short-term financial
performance (which can include economic value) has higher measurement quality in
economic value adopters and is used more extensively for problem identification and the
development of action plans.

emphasize flexibility and innovation to a greater extent than non-users, but the emphasis on Maintain
strategies is not significantly different.
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The greater emphasis on operational performance and short-term financials in
economic value users does not come at the expense of non-fmancial measures. On
average, economic v alue users make equal or greater use of information related to all of
the non-financial categories. For example, users report that employee measures are far
more important for problem identification and the development of action plans, are
externally disclosed to a greater extent, have higher measurement quality, and more likely
to have goals. Supplier measures, in turn, are used more extensively for goal setting and
the evaluation of capital investments. Goals related to the performance of alliances are
set to a greater extent, alliance performance measurement quality is higher, and greater
use is made of alliance information for performance evaluation. In contrast to the
balanced scorecard comparisons, economic v alue users have innovation measures with
higher measurement quality than non-users, and place greater emphasis on innovation
measures for problem identification and action plans. Information on customers is also
disclosed more extensively, along with information on environmental performance. In no
case is less emphasis placed on non-financial measures by economic v alue users than by
non-users. The equal or greater emphasis on many of the non-financial measures by
economic value users is consistent with surveys finding that economic value measures are
typically used in conjunction with other performance measures (Ittner and Larcker, 1998;
Answerthink and Stern Stewart, 200 1), and is inconsistent with claims that economic
value measures cause companies to overlook longer-term non-financial performance
information.
Reliance on a formal, causal business model or ''theory of the business" exhibits
the largest number of significant differences in the importance, measurement quality, and
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use of the various performance categories. Business model users perceive operational,
supplier, and environmental performance to be more important long-term value drivers
than firms making little or no use of causal business models. The greater importance
placed on supplier and environmental information for each measurement characteristic
supports this perception. The importance of operational performance leads business
model users to set more extensive operational goals. Business modeling is also positiv ely
associated with the use of quality and innovation measures for goal setting, problem
identification, performance evaluation, external disclosure, and measurement quality.

17

Overall, the evidence in Table 7 indicates that differences in value drivers and
performance measurement characteristics tend to be greater between users and non-users
of causal business models than between users and non-users of balanced scorecards or
economic value measurement. The evidence also indicates that many common
perceptions about the v alue drivers and measurement characteristics of balanced
scorecard and economic value users are incorrect, with economic value users placing
significantly more emphasis on non-financial measures than non-users and balanced
scorecard adopters exhibiting few differences from non-adopters.

4.5 Measurement Alignment Techniques and Firm Performance
The performance implications of the measurement alignment techniques (Hypothesis
4) are examined in Table 8. Although all three practices have strong, positiv e
associations with measurement system satisfaction (p < 0.01, two-tailed), the economic
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To examine claims that these three teclmiques lead to closer aligmnent between the firm' s strategies and
value drivers and its performance measurement system, we also estimated models regressing the absolute
values of the residuals from our strategy or value driver benchmark models on indicator variables for the
use of the three teclmiques. If these teclmiques lead to closer aligmnent, they should be negatively
associated with the absolute values of the residuals (i.e., use of these teclmiques leads to smaller deviations
from the benchmark model). None of the indicator variables was significant in any of the models,
providing no support for claims that these techniques result in closer performance measure aligmnent.
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results are weak and inconsistent. Only causal business modeling is positively associated
with any of the accounting and stock return measures, and then only with ROA.
Moreover, extensive use of balanced scorecards is negatively associated with ROA.
None of these techniques is statistically related to sales growth or either stock return
measure.
As an alternative specification (not reported in the tables), we added interactions
between business modeling and both balanced scorecard and economic value use as
additional predictor variables. Balanced scorecard and economic value advocates suggest
that these techniques are more beneficial when they are used in conjunction with causal
business models. The interactions were not significant, with the other results changing
little from those reported in Table 8.
We also repeated the tests after replacing the single balanced scorecard and single
economic value variables with two variables each: the first coded one if the respondent
stated that the technique is used (5 on the survey scale) and zero otherwise, and the
second coded one if the respondent stated that it is used extensively (6 on the survey
scale) and zero otherwise. Only the second variables capturing very extensive use were
statistically significant in the satisfaction model. No significant associations with
economic performance were found using any of these variables. Results also remained
virtually identical to those reported in Table 8 when the dichotomous business model
variable was replaced by a business model variable ranging from 1 (not at all) to 6
(completely).
Taken as a whole, these results provide little support for the hypothesis that the use of
these measurement alignment techniques influences economic performance.
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Furthermore, the contrasting satisfaction and financial results raise serious questions
about the validity of using satisfaction (or other perceived performance measures) as an
indicator of management accounting system success. 18
5. Performance Results in More Mature Systems
The preceding tests make no distinction between measurement systems that have
been in place for some time and those that have recently been modified. If the benefits
from improved strategic performance measurement take some time to materialize, these
benefits may not be observed in firms with recently modified systems. As a result, our
contemporaneous performance tests may understate the performance consequences of
strategic performance measurement practices.

Consequently, we repeat the analyses

using the 94 firms ( 67.1% of our sample) that report no major changes in their
_c
.
peuormance
measurement systems m
the past two years. 19

The results from these tests are summarized in Table 9. The performance
implications are quite similar to those using the entire sample. Measurement satisfaction
continues to have consistently positive associations with greater overall measurement
diversity, and particularly with greater non-fmancial measurement. Although the
coefficients on Negative Overall Residual and Negative N on-Financial Residual are
significantly positive in a few of the strategy alignment tests using this subsample, we
find little consistent evidence that lower than predicted measurement influences
performance.
13
As an additional robustness check of our financial performance results, we reran the tests using
measurement system satisfaction as an independent variable in place of the other proxies for system
characteristics and uses. This allows us to examine whether any financial benefits from strategic
performance measurement system characteristics are driven by users' satisfaction with these systems.
System satisfaction w as negatively associated with sales growth, and was not statistically significant in the
other accounting or stock return models.
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Accounting results remain limited and mixed. Both positive and negative
fmancial measurement residuals are positively associated with ROA in the value driver
alignment tests, indicating that either more or less financial measurement than firms with
similar value drivers is related to higher accounting performance. Positive Overall

Residual is negatively associated with sales growth using the alignment with either
strategy or value drivers. These findings are consistent with earlier results using the full
sample in Table 6. Positive N on-Financial Measurement Residual also has a significant
negative association with sales growth in the value driver alignment model.
The strongest and most consistent results relate to the association between
strategic measurement practices and stock returns. Positive Overall Residual and

Positive Non-Financial Measurement Residual have significant, positive associations
with both one- and three-year stock returns using either the strategy alignment or value
driver alignment variables. These results are not only consistent with those using the full
sample, but are more significant. In particular, one-year stock returns using Positive

Non-Financial Measurement Residual (computed using either strategy or value driver
alignment) are now significant at the 5% level or better (two-tailed) using this subsample,
while three-year stock returns (using either alignment variable) are now significant at the
10% level (two-tailed). Positive Financial Measurement R esidual is also positively
associated with three-year stock returns using the value driver alignment variable (and is
only marginally insignificant [p < 0.12, two-tailed] using the strategy alignment variable).
In no case is lower than predicted measurement significantly associated with stock
market performance.
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An additional advantage to using this subsample is that the three-year sales growth and three-year stock
return measures correspond to periods in which the current measurement system was in place.
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Business modeling remains strongly associated with measurement satisfaction
(p < 0.0 1, two-tailed). In contrast, economic value and balanced scorecard use are no
longer significantly associated with satisfaction, indicating that economic value and
scorecard users with more mature measurement system are not more satisfied than nonusers . Further analysis finds that the significant positive association between economic
value and scorecard use and satisfaction in the full sample is driven by higher satisfaction
in the subset of firms that hav e recently made major changes in their measurement
system. This result is particularly intriguing because it suggests that the higher
satisfaction associated with economic v alue and balanced scorecard systems may be
short-lived. Finally, none of the measurement alignment techniques is statistically related
to firm accounting or stock price performance, suggesting that our earlier insignificant
results for these techniques are not due to the inclusion of new measurement systems that
have not had time to yield significant performance improvements.

6. Conclusions
Using data from U.S . financial services firms, we examine the relativ e ability of
various strategic performance measurement approaches to explain firm performance.
These approaches include greater measurement diversity, improved alignment with firm
strategy and value drivers, and the use of performance measurement alignment
techniques including the balanced scorecard, economic value measures, and causal
business modeling. We find that a variation of the measurement diversity approach has
the strongest association with stock market performance. In particular, firms that make
more extensiv e use of a broad set of financial and (particularly) non-financial measures
than those with similar strategies or value drivers earn higher stock returns. These results
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are even stronger when the performance measurement system has undergone no
significant changes in the past three years.
In contrast, we find little evidence that SPM practices are associated with
accounting measures (ROA and sales growth). One potential explanation for these
contrasting results is that the performance implications of SPM systems are more likely
to be captured in forward-looking stock market measures than in short-term, historical
accounting measures. Finally, the measurement alignment techniques proposed in the
performance measurement literature are positively associated with measurement system
satisfaction, but exhibit almost no association with economic performance.
As with any study of this type, our results are subject to a number of limitations,
including potential response biases, endogeneity of our predictor variables, model
specification, and the difficulty in using a survey instrument to obtain factual, detailed
information on exactly how firms measure performance. In addition, our results may not
generalize to other industries or competitive settings. Future studies can also extend our
analyses by examining a broader set of performance measurement system attributes, such
as the level of aggregation and integration, that other studies have found to be
determinants ofthe perceived usefulness of measurement systems (e.g., Chenhall and
Morris, 1986) but are not included in our survey. Finally, prior research on management
accounting and performance measurement system innovations indicates that technical
and organizational factors can play an important role in the perceived success of system
implementation (e.g., Shields, 1995; Anderson and Young, 1999; Cavalluzzo and Ittner,
2003). Although we do not examine these factors in our tests due to the absence of data
on these issues, future studies can make a significant contribution by examining how
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these factors interact with system design choices to influence actual performance
outcomes.
Despite these limitations, our findings carry a number of implications for research
and practice. First, the differing results for measurement satisfaction and stock market
performance raise important questions about the validity of using perceptual satisfaction
or outcome measures to evaluate measurement system success. Although recent
practitioner publications promote the benefits of balanced scorecards and economic value
measures by citing surveys on measurement system satisfaction (e.g., Kaplan and Norton,
2001, pp. 356-357), we find no evidence that these higher satisfaction levels translate into
improved financial performance.
Second, the descriptive statistics on the use of the various performance measure
categories and business modeling practices by adopters and non-adopters of balanced
scorecards indicate that many firms that claim to have implemented this technique hav e
not fully adopted Kaplan and Norton's (1996, 2001) prescriptions. Future studies will
need to dev ise improved methods for eliciting what firms mean by a "balanced
scorecard" and how this information is actually being used.
Third, the significant performance implications of positive deviations from our
benchmark models indicate that (subject to the validity of these models) average
measurement practices of firms pursuing similar strategies or value drivers currently are
not optimal in this industry. Instead, our results indicate that greater measurement
emphasis and diversity than similar firms is associated with higher stock market
performance. The results also indicate that the appropriate benchmark for assessing
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measurement diversity is greater measurement relative to competitors with similar
strategies or value drivers rather than greater measurement on an absolute scale.
Finally, the greater explanatory power of stock return models using v alue driver
alignment as predictor variables suggest that researchers and practitioners should go
beyond the alignment of measurement practices with organizational strategy to
investigate and measure the specific value drivers underlying strategic success.
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Table 1
Mean Survey Responses on the Importance ofPerform ance Categories to Long-Term Organizational Success and Their Use in
Performance Measurement and Decision-Making

Importance to
Long-Term Success

Performance Category: f
Short-Term Financial Results
Customer Relations
Employee Relations
Operational Performance
Quality
Alliances
Supplier Relations
Environmental Performance
Innovation
Community

4.572
5.511
3.862
5.020
5.031
3.060
2.875
2.079
4.114
4.066

a

Extent
Goals
Set b

5.369
4.285
2.853
4.600
4.018
2.223
2.051
1.740
3.407
3.492

Extent Measures Related to These Categories Are Used
For the Fallowing_ Pure_oses:
Problem
Capital
Performance
External
Identification' Investments' Evaluation' Disclosured

5.190
4.378
2.775
4.573
3.992
2.204
2.063
1.594
3.294
3.053

4.581
3.917
2.109
4.431
3.876
2.122
2.150
1.695
3.598
2.641

5.138
4.236
2.913
4.747
3.723
1.938
1.904
1.485
2.94 1
2.814

5.428
2.722
1.871
3 .889
2.941
2 .262
1.664
1.572
3.005
3. 127

Measurement
Qualiti

5.465
3.724
2.465
4.453
3.588
1.979
2.001
1.634
2.706
2.804

Scale: 1 =measure not applicable or not at all important to 6 = extremely important
Scale: 1 =measure not applicable or no goals established to 6 =explicit goals established
c. Scale: 1 = measure not applicable or not used at all to 6 = used extensively
d. Scale: 1 = measure not applicable or no external disclosure to 6 = complete external disclosure
e. Scale: 1 = measure not applicable or extremely poor quality of measurement to 6 = high quality of measurement
f Performance categories are defined as short-term financial performance (e.g. , annual earnings, return on assets, cost reduction), customer relations (e.g., market
share, customer satisfaction, customer retention), employee relations (e.g ., employee satisfaction, turnover, workforce capabilities), supplier relations (e.g ., ontime delivery, input into product/service design), operational performance (e.g., productivity, safety, cycle time), product and service quality (e.g., defect rates,
quality awards), alliances with other organizations (e.g., j oint marketing or product design, joint ventures), environmental performance (e.g., government
citations, environmental compliance or certification), product and service innovation (e.g ., new product or service development success, development cycle
time), and community (e.g., public image, community involvement).
a.

b.

Table 2
Spearman Correlations Among Strategy Variables and Value Driver Importance Scores

Innovate
Maintain
Financial
Customer
Employee
Operations
Quality
Alliances
Suppliers
Environment
Innovation
Community

Flexible
-----....
0.50
0.1 5'
0.03
0.03
0.06
0.06
0.17"
0.21 ..
0.15'
0.11
0.16*
0.07

Innovate
0.16'
0.04
0.16'
0.25"'
0.13
0.20..
o.2s···
0.28""
0.16'
0.31•••
0.07

Maintain

Financial

Customer

0.07
0.12
0.13
0.10
0.12
0.05
0.03
0.20**
0.01
0.21"

0.13
-0.04
0.12
-0.11
-0.01
0.09
-0.12
0.11
0.03

0.32"'
0.32"'
o.35"*
0.23 ...
0.16'
0.03
0.41 ...
0.44"*

Employee

0.09
0.10
0.17**
0.20"
0.10
0.13
0.10

Operations

Quality

Alliances

Suppliers

F:nvironment

Innovation

0.33...
0.25*'*
0.1 9..
0.27*'*
o.3o*''

0.42""
0.26'**
0.31 ***
0.25***

0.45 '**
0.27***
0.10

0.22**
0.10

0.32...

0.40...
0.19**
0.11
0.13
0.25**"
0.17'*

Flexible = the extent to which the firm follows a strategy focused on flexibility; Innovate = the extent to which the firm follows an innovation-oriented strategy;
Maintain = the extent to which the firm follows a strategy focused on maintaining existing relationships in stable and predictable markets. See table 1 for
definitions of the remaining value driver performance categories.
***,**,*indicate p-value < 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 respectively (two-tailed).

Table 3
The Use of new Performance Measurement Techniques
in Financial Services Firms
Panel A. Use of Balanced Scorecard and Economic Value Measures (n = 140)

Not considered
Implemented and abandoned
Considering
Implementing now
Use
Use extensively

Balanced Scorecard
50.7%
1.4%
17.1%
10.7%
15.0%
5.0%

Economic Value Measures
31.4%
2.1%
22.1%
7.9%
24. 5%
12. 1%

Panel B. Formal Reliance on a "Theory of the Business" or Business Model That Causally Links
Performance Drivers to Performance Outcomes (n = 136)
1 =Not at all
29.7%
2
16.7%
3
18.8%
4
19.6%
5
10.8%
6 = Com.eletel:y 4.3%

Table 4
Association Between Measurement Diversity and Performance in Financial Services Firms
Panel A: Association Between Ov erall Measurement Diversity and Performance

Intercept
Overall Measurement Diversity

Satisfaction

ROA

Sales Growth

One-year Stock
Returns

Three-year
Stock Returns

0.0 12
(0.176)
0.873***
(6.255)

0.0 12
( 1.645)
0.001
(0.47 1)
0.597***
(7.082)
0.0006
(0.800)
-0.012***
(-3.056)

o.I5o**
(1.892)
-0.031
(-1.224)
0.674***
(4.609)
0.0069
(0.360)
-0.176***
(-3 .159)

0.045
(0.401)
0.087**
(2.033)
0.847***
(3.474)
-0.011 7
( -0.918)
0.0096
(0.160)

-0.305**
(-2.131)
0.064
(1.326)
1.219***
(3.852)
0.0236
(1.565)
0.0632
(0.633)

0. 2 15

0.321

0.259

0.095

0. 118

Sector Performance
SIZE
BTOM

Adj. R

2

Panel B: Association Between Financial and Non-Financial Measurement Focus and Performance

Intercept
Financial Measurement Focus
Non-Financial Measurement Focus

Satisfaction

ROA

Sales Growth

One-year Stock
Returns

Three-year
Stock Returns

0.0 12
(0.176)
0.072
(0.682)
0.793***
(5.830)

0.0 118
( 1.634)
-0.008
(-0.375)
0.0018
(0.607)
0.603***
(7.051)
0.006
(0.43 1)
-0.0124***
(-3.041 )

0.150*
(1.884)
-0.0041
(-0.219)
-0.0279
(-1.119)
0.675***
(4.527)
0.0069
(0.914)
-0.177***
(-3 .132)

0.045
(0.395)
-0.0032
(-0.102)
0.0843**
(2.035)
0.853***
(3.479)
-0.0115
(-0.903)
0.0102
(0.170)

-0.310**
(-2.153)
0.0213
(0.595)
0.0505
(1.093)
1.230***
(3.858)
0.0236
(1.562)
0.0695
(0.686)

0.210

0.3 17

0.252

0.088

0.1 11

Sector Performance
SIZE
BTOM

Adj. R2

***,**,*indicates p-value < 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 respectively (two-tailed test)
Overall Measurement Diversity= the average extent to which measures related to the ten performance categories are used for
performance evaluation and decision-making, have goals set, and have high quality of measurement. Financial Measurement
Focus = the average extent to which short-term accounting measures are used for performance evaluation and decisionmaking, have goals set, and have high quality of measurement. Non-Financial Measurement Focus= the average extent to
which measures related to the nine non-financial performance categories are used for performance evaluation and decisionmaking, have goals set, and have high quality of measurement. Sector Performance =the median performance of other firms
in the same four-digit SIC code. SIZE= the log of assets. BTOM =the ratio of book value of assets to the market value of
the firm (an inverse measure of growth opportunities).

Table 5
Association Between the Performance of Financial Services Firms and the Alignment Between
Measurement Practices and Firm Strategy

Panel A: Association Between Overall Measurement Alignment and Performance

Intercept
Positiv e Overall Measurement Residual
Negative Overall Measurement Residual

Satisfaction

ROA

Sales Growth

One-year Stock
Returns

Three-year
Stock Returns

-0.727***
( -2.4 15)
1.53o***
(3.875)
0.328
(0.797)

0.0058
(0.664)
0.0085
( 1.089)
0.0070
(0.884)
0.592***

0.1 99**
(2.166)
-0.0945
(-1 .408)
-0.0 156
( -0.223)
0.663***

-0.0994
(-0.732)
0.225**
(2 .046)
0.0854
(0.735)
0.837***

-0.460***
(-2 .824)
0. 240*
(1. 941)
0.150
(1.146)
1.2 18***

(6.917)
0.0007
(0.835)
-0.01 28***
(-3.133)

( 4.492)
0.0064
(0.856)
-0.177***
(-3 .170)

(3.407)
-0.0084
(-0.670)
0.0041
(0.068)

(3.867)
0.0245
(1.650)
0.0531
(0. 533)

0.322

0. 260

0.091

0.126

Sector Performance
SIZ E
BTOM

Adj. R 2

0.117

Panel B: Association between Financial and N on-Financial M easurement Alignment and Performance

Intercept
Positive Financial Measurement Residual
Negative Financial Measurement Residual
Positiv e Non-Financial Measurement Residual
Negative N on-Financial Measurement Residual

Satisfaction

ROA

Sales Growth

One-year Stock
Returns

Three-year
Stock Returns

-0.712**
(-2.234)
-0.112
(-0.273)
-0.285
(1.458)
1.526***
(4.074)
0.651
(1 .549)

0.0060
(0.656)
0.001 7
(0.225)
0.0026
(0.699)
0.0068
(0.87 1)
0.0074
(0.440)
0.605***
(6.824)
0.0007
(0.819)
-0.0128***
(-3.085)

0.195*
(1 .910)
-0.0627
(-0.833)
-0.0041
(-0.116)
-0.0598
(-0.851)
0.0227
(0. 294)
0.778***
(4.928)
0.0055
(0.686)
-0.189***
(-3.102)

-0.133
(-0.938)
0.114
(0.998)
0.0527
(0.935)
0.170
(1. 580)
0.0435
(0.372)
0.859***
(3.450)
-0.0069
( -0.543)
0.0082
(0.135)

-0.543***
(-3. 157)
0.193
(1.473)
0.0456
(0.730)
0. 177
(1.481)
0. 123
(0.932)
1.228***
(3.897)
0.0264*
(1.767)
0.0766
(0.754)

0.124

0.312

0.262

0.082

0. 127

Sector Performance
SIZ E
BTOM

Notes to Table 5

***,**,*

indicate p-value < 0 .01 ,0.05, 0.1 0 respectiv ely (two-tailed test)

The measurement residual variables represent the average standardized residuals from prediction models
regressing measurement uses, goal setting, and quality on the three strategy variables (Flexible, I nnovate, and
M aintain). The positive measurement residual variables equal the average residual if this value is positiv e, and
zero if it is negative. The negative measurement residual v ariables equal the absolute value of the average residual
if the average residual is negative, and zero if it is positive. See Table 4 for other variable defmitions.

Table 6
Association Between the Performance of Financial Services Firms and the Alignment Between
Measurement Practices and Firm Value Drivers
Panel A: Association Between Ov erall Measurement Alignment and Performance

Intercept
Positiv e Overall Measurement Residual
Negative Overall Measurement Residual

Satisfaction

ROA

Sales Growth

One-year Stock
Returns

Three-year
Stock Returns

-0.124
(0.6 16)
1.153***
(3.276)
-0.792**
(-2. 240)

0.0061
(0.709)
0.0090
( 1.147)
0.0071
(0.995)
0.603 ***

0.192**
(2.230)
-0.1 40**
(-2.153)
-0.0244
(-0.372)
0.673***

-0.0359
(-0.280)
0 .239**
(2 .263)
0.0071
(0.944)
0.82 1***

-0.347**
(-2.194)
0.244**
(2.049)
0.0002
(0.002)
1.170***

(7.146)
0.0006
(0.807)
-0.0129***
(-3.1 55)

( 4.672)
0.0086
(1.151 )
-0.165***
(-2.997)

(3.403)
-0.0129
(-1.025)
0.0004
(0.008)

(3.742)
0.0189
(1.269)
0.0429
(0.437)

0.323

0. 280

0.1 10

0.146

Sector Performance
SIZ E
BTOM

Adj. R 2

0.199

Panel B: Association between Financial and N on-Financial Measurement Alignment and Performance

Intercept
Positiv e Financial Measurement Residual
Negative Financial Measurem ent Residual
Positiv e Non-Financial Measurement Residual
Neg ative N on-Financial Measurement Residual

Satisfaction

ROA

Sales Growth

One-year Stock
Returns

Three-year
Stock Returns

-0.037
(-0.138)
-0.153
(-0.493)
-0. 293*
(-1.668)
1.100***
(0.317)
-0.564
(-1.643)

0.0050
(0.586)
0.0115*
(1.858)
0.0063*
(1.854)
0.0040
(0.536)
0.0027
(0.406)
0.597***
(7.054)
0.0005
(0.65 1)
-0.01 44 ***
(-3.488)

0.194**
(2. 252)
0.0660
(1.2 13)
0.0360
(1.174)
-0.1 55**
(-2.4 98)
-0.0475
(-0.7 54)
0.65 1***
( 4.405)
0.0073
(0.973)
-0.188***
(-3.302)

-0.0503
(-0.385)
0 .0870
(0.963)
0 .0246
(0.478)
0.197*
(1.955)
-0.0025
(-0.025)
0.816***
(3.353)
-0.0131
(-1.036)
-0.0094
(-0.1 53)

-0.392**
(-2.466)
0.222**
(2.248 )
0.049 1
(0.860)
0.160
(1.487)
-0.01 48
( -0.129)
1.232***
(3.950)
0.0184
(1.244)
0.0091
(0.091)

0.195

0.333

0. 284

0.099

0.1 63

Sector Performance
SIZ E
BTOM

Notes to Table 6

***,**,*

indicate p-value < 0 .01 ,0.05, 0 .1 0 respectiv ely (two-tailed test)

The measurement residual variables represent the av erage standardized residuals from prediction models
regressing measurement uses, goal setting, and quality on the ten value driver categories. The positive
measurement residual variables equal the av erage residual if this value is positive, and zero if it is negativ e. The
neg ativ e measurement residual variables equal the absolute v alue of the av erage residual if the average residual is
neg ativ e, and zero if it is positive. See Table 4 for other v ariable definitions.

Table 7
Significant Mean Differences in Value Drivers and Measurement Characteristics Between Users and Non-Users of Performance Measurement Alignment Technigues

Drivers ofLong-Term

Balanced Scorecard
Petformance Categoa
Use Not Use
N o Differences

Difference

Organizational Success

Extent Used in Problem Identification
and Developing Action Plans

No Differences

Economic Value Added
Petformance Categot:y
Use Not Use
Customers
5.67
5.42
Operational Petformance
5.27
4.87
Environmental
2.39
1.90

Difference
0.25
0.40
0.49

Short- Term Financial
Employee
Operational Petformance
Innovation

5.42
4.56
4.84
3.61

5.06
4.27
4.42
3.11

0.36
0.29
0.42
0.50

Business Modeling
Petfotmance Categoa
Use Not Use
Operational Petformance 5.45
4.95
Suppliers
3.37
2.79
Environmental
3.37
2.74

Difference
0.50
0.58
0.63

Employee
Quality
Suppliet·s
Environment
Innovation

3.42
5.07
2.71
2.15
4.50

2.65
3.81
1.49
1.49
3.09

0.77
1.26
1.22
0.66
1.41

Extent Used to Evaluate Capital Investments Employee

2.57

1.99

0.58

Operational Petformance
Suppliers

4.80
2.48

4.21
1.96

0.59
0.52

Extent Used in Petformance Measurement

3.44

2.78

0.66

Employee
Operational Petformance
A lliances

3.44
5.02
2.21

2.61
4.59
1.77

0.83
0.43
0.44

Employee
Quality
Alliances
Suppliers
Environment
Innovation

3.53
4.55
2.45
2.39
1.97
3.87

2.81
3.60
1.88
1.84
1.41
2.80

0.72
0.95
0.57
0.55
0.56
1.07

2.72
2.05
3.65

2.15
1.57
2.99

0.57
0.48
0.66

Customer
Employee
Operational Petformance

2.52
1.62
3.54
1.40

0.56
0.68
0.95
0.46

Quality
Alliances
Suppliers

Environmental

3.08
2.30
4.49
1.86

3.68
3.00
2.13
2.13
3.32

2.80
2.13
1.59
1.49
3.08

0.88
0.87
0.54
0.64
0.24

ls hort-Tetm Financial
Employees
Operational Petformance
Innovation

5.70
2.90
4.89
2.95

5.33
2.22
4.20
2.57

0.37
0.68
0.69
0.38

Alliances
Suppliers
Environmental
Innovation

4.42
2.47
2.53
2.13
3.45

3.44
1.91
1.92
1.52
2.57

0.98
0.56
0.61
0.61
0.88

3.29
4.95
2.48
2.30

2.6
4.39
2.07
1.90

0.69
0.56
0.41
0.40

Customer
Operational Petformance
Quality
Suppliers
Environment
Innovation

4.79
5.08
4.92
2.71
2.34
4.36

4.20
4.54
3.87
1.94
1.64
3.27

0.59
0.54
1.05
0.77
0.70
1.09

Extent Used in External Disclosure

Employee

IAlliance
Supplier
Community

Measurement Quality

Extent Goals Set

IEmployees

Isuppliers

3.05

2.51

2.31

1.93

0.74

0.58

IEmployee
Opet·ational Petformance
Alliances
Suppliers

Environment
Innovation
Quality

Cells report significant differences in mean practices (p < 0.10, two-tailed t-tests) between users and non-users of the measurement alignment techniques (coded 1 if used extensively, else 0)

Table 8
The Relation Between Financial Performance and Performance Measurement
Alignment Techniques

Intercept
Economic Value
Balanced Scorecard
Business Modeling

Satisfaction

ROA

Sales Growth

-0.353
(-3.757)
0.454***
(3.026)
0.537***
(2.957 )
0.676***
(3.250 )

0.0105
(1.341 )
0.0037
(1.165)
-0.01 17***
(-2.787)
0. 0078*
(1.67)
0.354***
(5.055)
0.0018
(1.256)
-0.01 15***
(-2.643)

0. 187

0.263

Sector Performance
SIZE
BTOM

Adj . R 2

0.192
(2.301)
-0.0427
(-1.516)
-0.037 1
(-0.995)
0.0477
( 1.119)
o.66o***
(4.351 )
0. 0059
(0.696)
-0.204***
(-3 .437)

One-year
Stock Returns
0.0109
(0.091 )
-0.0345
(-0.739)
-0.0616
(-0.968)
0.0271
(0.407)
0.869***
(3.378)
-0.0034
(-0.229)
0.0033
(0.053)

Three-year
Stock Returns
-0.301
(-1.923)
0.0259
(0.493)
-0.0225
(0.283)
0.0348
(0.428 )
1.223***
(3.677)
0.0232
(1 .329 )
0.0366
(0.339)

0.258

0.057

0.078

***, **, * indicate p-v alue < 0.01 ,0.05, 0.10 respectively (two-tailed test)
Economic Value= 1 ifthe firm uses economic v alue measures, 0 otherwise; Balanced Scorecard = 1 if the firm uses a
balanced scorecard, 0 otherwise; Business Modeling= 1 if the firm makes extensive use of forma, causal business modeling,
0 otherwise. See Table 4 for other variable definitions.

Table 9
Coefficients on the Performance Measurement Constructs in the Subsample of Firms
With More Mature Measurement Systems
(No Major Changes in Past Two Years)
Satisfaction

ROA

Sales
Growth

One-year
Stock
Returns

Three-year
Stock
Returns

0.892***

-0. 001

-0.042

0.060

0.055

Financial Measurement Focus
Non-Financial Measurement Focus

-0. 022
o.85o***

-0. 000
-0. 001

0. 004
-0.041

-0. 013
0.064

-0.003
0.054

With Strateg,}!. (HJ!.e.othesis 2l
Positive Overall Residual
N egative Overall Residual

2.382***
0.953*

0.009
0.010

-0. 191 **
-0.072

0.257**
0. 118

0.31 9**
0.212

Positive Financial Measurement Residual
N egative Financial Measurement Residual
Positive N on-Financial Measurement Residual
N egative Non-Financial Measurement Residual

0.326
0.088
2.125 ***
0.889*

-0. 001
0.001
0.009
0.009

-0.117
-0.03 1
-0.115
0.010

-0.093
-0. 008
0. 280**
0. 135

0.133
0.063
0.255 *
0.155

With Valu e Drivers (H)!.12.0thesis 3)
Positive Overall Residual
Negative Overall Residual

1.682***
-0. 334

0.007
0.003

-0.203 **
-0.069

0.307***
0. 158

0.320**
0.098

Positive Financial Measurement Residual
Negative Financial Measurement Residual
Positive N on-Financial Measurem ent Residual
N egative Non-Financial Measurement Residual

0 .282
0.112
1.479***
-0. 380

0.016**
0.007*
-0. 000
-0.002

0.075
0.027
-0.2 12***
-0.083

0.015
0.000
0.284***
0. 152

0 .237*
0.086
0 .244*
0.064

0.322
0 .444
1.014***

0.002
0.002
0.001

-0.009
0.059
-0.019

-0.008
-0.080
-0.027

0 .043
-0.050
0.061

Overall M easuremen t P ractices (Hv12.othesis
Overall Measurement Diversity

ll

A li~nment

A li~nment

Measurement A li~nment Technig_ues

(H J!.e.othesis 4 )

Economic Value
Balanced Scorecard
Business Modeling

***, ** ,* indicate p-value < 0.01,0. 05, 0.1 0 respectively (two-tailed test)
See Tables 4 to 7 for variable definitions.

